Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 51
Number 1 Fall 2006

Article 6

2006

Lawyer Liability and the Vortex of Deepening Insolvency
Douglas R. Richmond
Aon risk Servs. - Professional Servs. Group, doug.richmond@aon.com

Rebecca Lamberth
Alston & Bird, LLP, rebecca.lamberth@alston.com

Ambreen Delawalla
Alston & Bird, LLP, Ambreen.delawalla@alston.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Douglas R. Richmond, Rebecca Lamberth & Ambreen Delawalla, Lawyer Liability and the Vortex of
Deepening Insolvency, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol51/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LAWYER LIABILITY AND THE VORTEX OF DEEPENING
INSOLVENCY
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,* REBECCA LAMBERTH**
& AMBREEN DELAWALLA***

INTRODUCTION
A prominent bankruptcy scholar once opined that “no ethical or rational
lawyer should ever willingly represent an insolvent corporation outside
bankruptcy,” an “absurdity” attributable to the fact that simply by representing
an insolvent corporation, lawyers may incur liability to the client’s creditors.1
Lawyers’ liability exposure is not created when a business client bottoms out
in bankruptcy or receivership, but derives instead from the client’s spiraling
descent. When a corporation enters the zone of insolvency or becomes
insolvent, its directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties expand to include
creditors.2 The directors and officers are obligated to protect creditors’
financial interest in the company.3 If through fraud or other tortious conduct
they prolong the company’s life beyond insolvency and harm the creditors by
increasing the corporation’s debt or by dissipating its assets, liability may
follow on a “deepening insolvency” theory.4 Some jurisdictions may deem the
* Senior Vice President in the Professional Services Group, Aon Risk Services in Chicago,
Illinois.
** Partner, Alston & Bird in Atlanta, Georgia. J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A.,
Vanderbilt University.
*** Associate, Alston & Bird in Atlanta, Georgia. J.D., Columbia Law School; B.S., Duke
University.
1. Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer
Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAC. 403, 403 (1997).
2. Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 603 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2005); Kittay v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 460 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004).
3. See Myron M. Sheinfeld & Judy H. Pippitt, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a
Corporation in the Vicinity of Insolvency and After Initiation of a Bankruptcy Case, 60 BUS.
LAW. 79, 88–89 (2004) (discussing “trust fund” and “at risk” theories for imposing fiduciary
duties on directors of insolvent corporations).
4. In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 333 B.R. 397, 421–22 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (stating that
deepening insolvency liability can be predicated on negligence and explaining how fraudulently
concealing and incurring debt causes harm).
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corporation itself to be harmed by the actions of the directors and officers.5
Deepening insolvency theory, as with the vortex of any corporate fraud,
potentially sucks in the company’s lawyers via allegations that they aided and
abetted the officers’ and directors’ breach of their fiduciary duties or that they
conspired with them to accomplish their unlawful purposes.
To be sure, a distressed company’s acquisition of additional debt, standing
alone, is not unlawful.6 Merely prolonging an insolvent corporation’s
existence is no basis for liability.7 Directors and officers of a distressed
corporation have no blanket duty to seek bankruptcy protection or to liquidate
the company for creditors’ immediate benefit.8 The fiduciaries of an insolvent
business, or one that is nearly so, might reasonably conclude that operating
through desperately lean times is required to create long-term value.9 That is
often the case with start-up businesses; even many established businesses
function in the zone of insolvency.10 A plaintiff proceeding on a deepening
insolvency theory should therefore have to show that a defendant prolonged
the company’s existence through the breach of a separate duty or the
commission of an actionable tort.11 A plaintiff resting a deepening insolvency
claim on fraud allegations must plead supporting facts with particularity.12
5. See, e.g., id. at 421 (explaining how deepening insolvency harms corporation); Ranalli v.
Ferrari (In re Unifi Commc’ns, Inc.), 317 B.R. 13, 16–18 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding that
bankruptcy trustee had standing to sue because deepening insolvency harmed debtor corporation
itself); Hannover Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1997) (noting
“that the aggravation of insolvency or prolonging the life of an insolvent business has been
considered to constitute injury to the corporation”).
6. Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 333 B.R. 506, 530 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 2005).
7. Limor v. Buerger (In re Del-Met Corp.), 322 B.R. 781, 813 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005);
In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 458.
8. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc. v. Beckhoff
(In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc.), Nos. 01-11457 through 01-11469(ALG), Adv. No. 032176(ALG), 2003 WL 22989669, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003).
9. In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460; see also Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In
re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (observing that “it is not
uncommon for a corporation to revitalize itself and work out financial problems no matter how
dire they appear”).
10. See Robert R. Keatinge, Lawyers’ Liabilities in Representing Troubled Organizational
Clients, Speech at Ass’n of Prof’l Responsibility Lawyers Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 10, 2006)
(“Lots of companies are in the vicinity of insolvency or zone of insolvency.”).
11. Devon Mobile Commc’ns Liquidating Trust v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), No. 02-41729, Adv. No. 04-03192, 2006 WL 687153, at *16–18
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2005); In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 333 B.R. at 516; In re Del-Met Corp., 322 B.R. at
813; In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 458.
12. See Corp. Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multi-Service Aviation Corp., No. Civ. A. 03-3020,
2004 WL 1900001, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2004) (dismissing deepening insolvency claim

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

LAWYER LIABILITY AND THE VORTEX OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY

129

Generally speaking, however, deepening insolvency theory is not clearly
defined or limited.13 As the court in Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP14 observed,
“it is difficult to grasp exactly what the theory entails.”15 Or, as one corporate
law scholar recently noted, “[i]t is very difficult right now to know what the
law is [in this area].”16
Several aspects of deepening insolvency theory are especially
disconcerting for lawyers. For example, deepening insolvency theory seeks to
hold lawyers representing a distressed corporation liable to non-clients
(corporate creditors), to whom they otherwise owe no duties, and whose
interests may conflict with the client.17 If a lawyer represents both the
corporation and an insider—a common joint representation—she may face
additional liability attributable to her multiple roles. Lawyers may not be able
to avoid problems or cure conflicts of interest by withdrawing from an
insolvent client’s representation because of timing issues or because the client
will be unable to secure new counsel given the decreased prospect of payment.
Furthermore, even baseless deepening insolvency claims are expensive to
defend and may harm a law firm’s reputation. To the extent that representing
financially infirm companies is seen as “foolhardy,” or the associated risks are
perceived to be “too high for any ethical or rational lawyer,”18 deepening
insolvency theory has the undesirable effect of discouraging good lawyers
from representing clients that would benefit from their advice. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many lawyers perceive representing financially troubled
companies outside of bankruptcy to be a “really frightening area of the law.”19
This article explores the contours of deepening insolvency theory as it
applies to lawyers. Section I examines the history of deepening insolvency
because plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege fraud); Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Monahan
Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that because deepening
insolvency claim rested on the defendants’ exploitation and looting of the debtor, the underlying
fraud allegations had to be pleaded with particularity); In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, 2003 WL
22989669, at *6–7 (discussing constructive fraud allegations forming basis for deepening
insolvency claim).
13. Jo Ann J. Brighton, Deepening Insolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2004, at 34, 79;
see also Paul Rubin, New Liability Under “Deepening Insolvency”, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr.
2004, at 50, 69 (noting confusion surrounding elements of deepening insolvency as a cause of
action and observing that it is unclear how deepening insolvency damages should be measured).
14. 421 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005).
15. Id. at 1003–04.
16. Ann E. Conaway, Professor, Widener University School of Law, Lawyers’ Liabilities in
Representing Troubled Organizational Clients, Speech at Ass’n of Prof’l Responsibility Lawyers
Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 10, 2006).
17. See Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 342–45
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that under California law lawyers do not owe duties to clients’
creditors and should not be held to owe duties to third parties adverse to the lawyer’s client).
18. Markell, supra note 1, at 428.
19. Conaway, supra note 16.
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litigation. It discusses deepening insolvency as a theory of damages and as an
independent cause of action. Section II probes the elements of deepening
insolvency claims.
Among other things, we contend that deepening
insolvency, if anything more than a catch phrase, is at most and only rarely a
viable damages theory; we argue that deepening insolvency cannot constitute
an independent cause of action; we examine the role of the business judgment
rule as a defense in deepening insolvency litigation; and we discuss causation,
foreseeability, and damages in deepening insolvency cases. Finally, Section III
offers lawyers practical advice on avoiding liability in deepening insolvency
cases.
I. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
“Deepening insolvency,” whether expressing an independent tort or a
theory of damages, is a matter of state law; it is not a creature of the
bankruptcy code or other federal law.20 To the extent the theory is discussed
by federal courts, that discussion most often occurs in the context of predicting
whether a state’s highest court would adopt the theory as a new cause of
action, or whether it would recognize it as a measure of damages.21 Deepening
insolvency theory traces back to Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding
Corp. of New York Securities Litigation),22 in which a bankruptcy trustee
alleged that the corporate debtor’s insiders looted the corporation and, as part
of their scheme, artificially prolonged the corporation’s existence to mask their
past misdeeds and to raise new capital to steal.23 In defending against the
trustee’s allegations that it aided and abetted the insiders’ fraud, the debtor’s
accounting firm raised the adverse inference exception to the general rule that
an agent’s knowledge is imputed to her principal.24 Addressing this aspect of
agency law, the Bloor court stated: “A corporation is not a biological entity for
which it can be presumed that any act which extends its existence is beneficial
to it.”25 Because the insiders’ artificial extension of the debtor’s solvency
benefited only them and their confederates and not the corporation, which
continued to deteriorate financially as their scheme went on, the court declined
to impute the insiders’ knowledge to the corporation.26
The Bloor court could have foregone discussion of the debtor’s “deepening
insolvency” and still have decided the case in the trustee’s favor. The court’s

20. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop.
(In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 638 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
21. See id. at 638–39 (mentioning only the recognition of a new cause of action).
22. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
23. Id. at 541.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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discussion of the subject is therefore dicta.27 What began as dicta in a portion
of a district court opinion discussing a point of agency law, however,
developed into much more. Deepening insolvency claims have become
standard in lawsuits brought by government regulators arising out of the failure
of financial institutions and insurance companies.28 The thrust in these cases is
that by fraudulently creating the appearance that the institution or insurer was
solvent, the defendants prevented authorities from timely placing the entity
into receivership.29
Deepening insolvency claims are now common in lawsuits by bankruptcy
trustees and other private litigants arising out of business failures.30 The
implication in these cases is that had the defendants not falsely created the
impression that the company was solvent, the shareholders would have
dissolved it when they could still salvage their investments, or that creditors
could have involuntarily placed the company into bankruptcy before its assets
were dissipated.
Not all courts recognize deepening insolvency theory.31 Many courts do
recognize it, however, and treat deepening insolvency allegations in one of two
ways. First, some courts treat deepening insolvency as a theory of damages.32

27. See Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (defining
dictum as “a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding”).
28. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Ins. v. Chase Bank of Tex. Nat’l Ass’n, 274 F.3d 924, 935 (5th
Cir. 2001) (discussing deepening insolvency in this context); Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co.,
545 N.Y.S.2d 278, 283–84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
29. Fla. Dep’t of Ins., 274 F.3d at 935.
30. See Sabin Willett, The Shallows of Deepening Insolvency, 60 BUS. LAW. 549, 549 (2005)
(referring to bankruptcy trustees and administrators of bankruptcy estates, and identifying some
potential defendants).
31. See, e.g., Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601–02
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as a cause of action under North
Carolina law); Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 333 B.R. 506, 517 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency theory as duplicative of other claims); Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec
Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 641–46 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting theory under Texas
law); Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, C.A. No. 1571-N, 2006 WL 2434228, at
*28–30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency theory in any form); Bondi v.
Citigroup, Inc., No. BER-L-10902-04, 2005 WL 975856, at *21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb.
28, 2005) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as a theory of liability); Coroles v. Sabey,
79 P.3d. 974, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as a
damage theory).
32. See, e.g., Bondi v. Grant Thornton Int’l (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 377 F. Supp. 2d 390,
419 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing Illinois law); Bookland of Me. v. Baker, Newman & Noyes,
LLC, 271 F. Supp. 2d 324, 325–26, 332, 326 n.5 (D. Me. 2003) (leaving open possibility that
court might ultimately certify deepening insolvency issue to the Supreme Court of Maine);
Rafool v. Goldfarb Corp. (In re Fleming Packaging Corp.), 336 B.R. 398, 401 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
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Damages are measured by the failed corporation’s increased debt or by the
dissipation of its assets after the time it became insolvent. Second, other
jurisdictions recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of
action.33
A.

Deepening Insolvency as a Theory of Damages

The Seventh Circuit energized deepening insolvency as a theory of
damages in Schacht v. Brown.34 In that case, the Illinois Director of Insurance,
acting as the liquidator of Reserve Insurance Company, alleged that the
defendants carried out a fraudulent scheme in which Reserve’s corporate
parent continued Reserve’s business even though the insurer was insolvent.
This saddled Reserve with additional liabilities and drove it deeper into
insolvency damaging Reserve, its policyholders, and its creditors in an amount
exceeding $100 million.35 Had the Illinois Department of Insurance known
that Reserve was insolvent, the Director alleged, it would have prevented
Reserve from continuing to write insurance and would have acted to prevent
the further dissipation of the company’s assets.36
The defendants challenged the Director’s standing to sue on Reserve’s
behalf, arguing that “a corporation may never sue to recover damages alleged
to have resulted from the artificial prolongation of an insolvent corporation’s
life.”37 The Schacht court disagreed. First, the alleged harm to Reserve
stemmed not only from the extension of its normal business operations, but
from specific actions in connection with the extension that crippled the
company.38 Beyond allowing Reserve’s assets to be dissipated by its normal
business operations, the defendants allegedly siphoned millions of dollars out
of the company and drained it of its most profitable and least risky business,

2006) (attempting to predict Delaware law); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship
Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001).
33. See, e.g., Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672,
677 (3d Cir. 2006); Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2005); Rahl
v. Bande, 328 B.R. 387, 416–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Monahan
Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 39–40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); OHC Liquidation Trust v.
Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 527–31 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006); In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 333 B.R. 397, 421–22 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); Limor v.
Buerger (In re Del-Met Corp.), 322 B.R. 781, 811–15 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005); Miller v. Dutil
(In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 619–20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005); Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 750–
52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
34. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
35. Id. at 1345.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1349–50.
38. Id. at 1350.
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thereby deepening its insolvency.39 In other words, the defendants’ “bleeding
of Reserve” was part of a fraudulent scheme.40
Second, the court rejected the suggestion “that the fraudulent prolongation
of a corporation’s life beyond insolvency is automatically to be considered a
benefit to the corporation’s interests.”41 That “premise collides with common
sense” because a corporation descending ever deeper into insolvency “is
ineluctably damaged” by its increasing obligations to creditors.42 As the court
further explained:
Indeed, in most cases, it would be crucial that the insolvency of the corporation
be disclosed, so that shareholders may exercise their right to dissolve the
corporation in order to cut their losses. . . . Thus, acceptance of a rule which
would bar a corporation from recovering damages due to the hiding of
information concerning its insolvency would create perverse incentives for
wrong-doing officers and directors to conceal the true financial condition of
43
the corporation from the corporate body as long as possible.

Several courts have followed Schacht,44 even when the recognition of
deepening insolvency as a theory of damages is counterintuitive, as was the
case in Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co.45 Allard was the bankruptcy trustee
for DeLorean Motor Company (DMC).46 He sued DMC’s former auditors,
Arthur Andersen & Company (Andersen), for malpractice, negligence, breach
of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, aiding and abetting fraud and/or breach
of fiduciary duty, securities fraud, aiding and abetting securities fraud, RICO
violations, aiding and abetting RICO violations, and violating a Michigan
statute.47 Among other things, the trustee sought damages based on DMC’s
indebtedness to trade creditors.48 Moving for summary judgment, Andersen
argued that the trustee could not recover such damages because “DMC could
not conceivably have been damaged by further indebtedness because the
indebtedness provided a benefit—more capital—to the company.”49

39. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1350.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Hannover Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854 (M.D. La. 1997) (citing
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347–48 (7th Cir. 1983)); In re LTV Steel Co., 333 B.R. 397,
422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (quoting Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983));
In re Latin Inv. Corp., 168 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D.C. 1993) (quoting Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d
1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983)).
45. 924 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
46. Id. at 490.
47. Id. at 491.
48. See id. at 494.
49. Id. at 494.
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Acknowledging that Andersen’s argument was “intuitively appealing,” the
court nonetheless rejected it, relying on Schacht.50
The Allard court observed that credit may be an illusory financial cushion
“that lulls shareholders into postponing the decision to dissolve a corporation”
before management can squander the company’s remaining resources, such
that the infusion of capital from creditors does not necessarily benefit a
distressed corporation.51 Furthermore, Andersen’s principal attack on the
trustee’s “deepening insolvency” theory was that it was not legally recognized;
Andersen did not attack the factual basis for the theory in the case at hand.52
The court reasoned that “because courts have permitted recovery on a
‘deepening insolvency’ theory,” Andersen was not entitled to summary
judgment on any portion of the trustee’s case representing damages attributable
to DMC’s indebtedness to trade creditors.53
Allard should be afforded little weight. First, one of the two cases
permitting recovery for deepening to which insolvency the Allard court
referred in rejecting the defendant’s arguments was Bloor v. Dansker (In re
Investors Funding Corp. of New York Securities Litigation).54 As noted
previously, the discussion in Bloor supposedly advocating deepening
insolvency theory was dicta.55 Second, the Allard court was persuaded by the
fact that other courts recognized deepening insolvency theory and,
conjunctively, that no cases appeared to have explicitly rejected the theory.56
That basis for decision no longer exists. There are now a number of cases
rejecting deepening insolvency claims.57 Third, Andersen offered no facts to
50. Allard, 924 F. Supp. at 494.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. (quoting In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
55. See In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. 533; supra text accompanying notes
22–26.
56. See Allard, 924 F. Supp. at 494.
57. See, e.g., Askanase v. Fatjo, No. Civ. A. H-91-3140, 1996 WL 33373364, at *28 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 1, 1996) (rejecting trustee’s deepening insolvency argument because the insolvent
debtor was not damaged by the false financial statements, since the shareholders had already lost
all of their equity and there was no allegation of harm to creditors); Fla. Dep’t of Ins. v. Chase
Bank of Tex. Nat’l Ass’n, 274 F.3d 924, 935–36 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the plaintiff had
presented no evidence of additional debt incurred by an insolvent insurer and, thus, no evidence
of damages); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(discussing North Carolina law); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 646 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005)
(rejecting deepening insolvency theory as duplicating torts established under Texas law); Kittay
v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 456–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2004); Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, C.A. No. 1571-N, 2006 WL 2434228,
at *28–30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
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support its argument against deepening insolvency damages. The trustee
apparently refused to answer interrogatories that might have provided
Andersen with ammunition for its argument, but it never sought to compel the
trustee’s responses.58 Although experienced litigators can appreciate how such
things happen, this failure is glaring because the trustee offered no specific
evidence supporting his deepening insolvency theory.59 Had Andersen better
prepared its defense, the case might have turned out differently.
Finally, there is generally no merit in the Allard court’s position that
further indebtedness may create an illusory financial cushion that lulls
creditors into a false sense of security. This is easily illustrated by way of
example. Consider a company with no cash and $1 million in debt that
borrows an additional $1 million. The company now has $1 million in cash
and $2 million in debt. The company’s degree of insolvency, however, is
unchanged. The creditors remain able to judge the wisdom of allowing the
company to operate at that particular level of insolvency. There is, in short, no
way that a company’s mere borrowing should lull creditors into a false sense of
security.60
B.

Deepening Insolvency as an Independent Cause of Action

Deepening insolvency may be more than a theory of damages. Plaintiffs
suing in connection with corporate meltdowns often allege that deepening
insolvency theory is an independent cause of action. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.61 is generally considered the
leading case on deepening insolvency as a cause of action.
Lafferty arose out of the activities of the Shapiro family.62 The Shapiros
allegedly operated Walnut Equipment Leasing Company and its wholly owned
subsidiary, Equipment Leasing Corporation of America (ELCOA), as a Ponzi
scheme.63 Cogen Skar, LLP (Cogen) served as accountants for the Shapiro
family’s operations and R.F. Lafferty & Company (Lafferty) served as the
family’s independent underwriters.64 Cogen and Lafferty allegedly conspired
with the Shapiros “to render opinions replete with multiple fraudulent
misstatements and material omissions concerning Walnut and ELCOA’s
financial statements.”65 When the Shapiros’ scheme collapsed, Walnut and
58. Allard, 924 F. Supp. at 494.
59. Id.
60. See William Bates III, Deepening Insolvency: Into the Void, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar.
2005 at 1, 60 (describing borrowing in this context as “solvency-neutral”); Willett, supra note 30,
at 552–55.
61. 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001).
62. Id. at 344.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id.
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ELCOA sought bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.66 The trustee in their case appointed an Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (the Committee).67
In February 1999, the Committee sued the Shapiros and various companies
owned by them, Walnut’s and ELCOA’s officers and directors, Cogen, and
Lafferty, alleging that the defendants “wrongfully expanded the debtors’ debt
out of all proportion of their ability to repay and ultimately forced the debtors
to seek bankruptcy protection.”68 The Committee also sued the Shapiros,
Cogen, and Lafferty for federal securities law violations, common law fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of contract, professional malpractice, and aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty.69 The defendants moved to dismiss.70 The district court
dismissed the claims against Cogen and Lafferty under the doctrine of in pari
delicto.71 The court denied the other defendants’ motions.72 The Committee
then severed its claims against Cogen and Lafferty and appealed their
dismissal.73 Cogen settled with the Committee, leaving Lafferty as the sole
appellee.74
On appeal, the Third Circuit was called upon to determine “whether the
alleged theory of injury—’deepening insolvency’—[was] cognizable under
Pennsylvania law,” no Pennsylvania appellate court having directly addressed
the issue.75 The Lafferty court concluded that if presented with the issue, “the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would determine that ‘deepening insolvency’
may give rise to a cognizable injury.”76 As the court explained:
First and foremost, the theory is essentially sound. Under federal bankruptcy
law, insolvency is a financial condition in which a corporation’s debts exceed
the fair market value of its assets. . . . Even when a corporation is insolvent, its
corporate property may have value. The fraudulent and concealed incurrence
of debt can damage that value in several ways. For example, to the extent that
bankruptcy is not already a certainty, the incurrence of debt can force an
insolvent corporation into bankruptcy, thus inflicting legal and administrative

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 346.
Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 355. In pari delicto means “in equal fault” or “equally culpable.”
BRYAN A. GARNER, DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 451 (2d ed. 1995). When invoked
as an affirmative defense, the doctrine “provides that a plaintiff may not assert a claim against a
defendant if the plaintiff bears fault for the claim.” Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 354.
72. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 346.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 349.
76. Id.
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costs on the corporation. . . . When brought on by unwieldy debt, bankruptcy
also creates operational limitations which hurt a corporation’s ability to run its
business in a profitable manner. . . . Aside from causing actual bankruptcy,
deepening insolvency can undermine a corporation’s relationships with its
customers, suppliers, and employees. The very threat of bankruptcy, brought
about through fraudulent debt, can shake the confidence of parties dealing with
the corporation, calling into question its ability to perform, thereby damaging
the corporation’s assets, the value of which often depends on the performance
of other parties. . . . In addition, prolonging an insolvent corporation’s life
through bad debt may simply cause the dissipation of corporate assets. These
harms can be averted, and the value within an insolvent corporation salvaged,
if the corporation is dissolved in a timely manner, rather than kept afloat with
77
spurious debt.

Moreover, in Pennsylvania, as in most jurisdictions, it is settled that
“where there is an injury, the law provides a remedy.”78 The Lafferty court
thus reasoned that where deepening insolvency damages a corporation’s
property, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would provide a remedy by
recognizing a cause of action for that injury.79
The court ultimately concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would “recognize ‘deepening insolvency’ as giving rise to a cognizable injury
in the proper circumstances.”80 Unfortunately for the Committee, the court
further concluded that the in pari delicto doctrine barred the Committee, which
stood in the debtors’ shoes, from pursuing its claims against Lafferty.81 The
Third Circuit thus affirmed the district court judgment.82
Early on, the Lafferty court stated that “‘deepening insolvency’ constitutes
a valid cause of action under Pennsylvania state law and that the Committee
therefore had standing” to sue the many defendants.83 Beyond that isolated
statement, however, it is difficult to understand why Lafferty is thought to be
authority for recognizing deepening insolvency as a cause of action. The
Committee did not plead deepening insolvency as an independent cause of
action; it pleaded federal securities law violations, common law fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, mismanagement and breach of
fiduciary duty, professional malpractice, and aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty.84 The allegation of deepening insolvency that appears to be the
centerpiece of the case—that the defendants “wrongfully expanded the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 349–50.
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 360.
Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 352.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345–46.
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[d]ebtors’ debt out of all proportion of their ability to repay and ultimately
forced the [d]ebtors to seek bankruptcy protection”—was apparently an
allegation made within one of the pleaded causes of action.85 At most, then,
the debtors’ deepening insolvency was either a fact supporting one or more of
the Committee’s causes of action or it was an element of damage.
Key passages of the opinion indicate that deepening insolvency should at
most be an element of damage. For example, after donning “the soothsayer’s
garb” to predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule, the Lafferty
court wrote “that, if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would determine that ‘deepening insolvency’ may give rise to a cognizable
injury.”86 That is as much a statement of damages theory as it is anything else.
The court’s recognition of the “venerable principle[]” of Pennsylvania law
that “where there is an injury, the law provides a remedy,”87 does not indicate
otherwise. The question for the court was whether an insolvent corporation is
damaged if it becomes poorer still, i.e., whether deepening insolvency is an
injury. If so, the remedies the law provides already existed among the causes
of action the Committee pleaded in its complaint. The court went on to state
that “an identifiable and compensable injury is essential to the existence of tort
liability,” and that “where a contractual breach occurs, contract law seeks to
give the nonbreaching party the benefit of his or her bargain, to put him or her
in the position he or she would have been in had there been no breach.”88
These statements clearly indicate that deepening insolvency is at most an
element of damage. With respect to the first, the court could just as easily have
written, “identifiable damages are essential to the existence of tort liability,”
and the second is a hornbook statement of contract damages.
Finally, if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize a deepening
insolvency cause of action, what elements would it require a plaintiff to prove?
Duty? Breach? Proximate cause? Reasonable reliance? Scienter? The fact
that these elements are nowhere explained in the opinion is compelling
evidence that the Lafferty court’s early statement that “‘deepening insolvency’
constitutes a valid cause of action under Pennsylvania state law”89 was in fact
an awkward expression of the court’s belief that under Pennsylvania law, a
plaintiff suing in tort or for breach of contract may recover damages for a
company’s deepening insolvency.
In summary, a careful reading of Lafferty reveals little support for
recognizing deepening insolvency as a cause of action. Unfortunately, when
recently given the chance to correct the problems with Lafferty or to retreat

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 345.
Id. at 349.
Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 351.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 344.
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from its holding another case involving allegations of deepening insolvency
under Pennsylvania law, in In re CitX Corp., Inc.,90 the Third Circuit did not
utilize that opportunity. Instead, the court in In re CitX rather summarily
reaffirmed that deepening insolvency is an independent cause of action under
Pennsylvania law, albeit one linked only to fraud.91
In In re CitX, an insolvent company operating a Ponzi scheme used its
financial statements to lure investors.92 The company burned through the
investors’ money, incurred millions more in debt, and filed for bankruptcy
protection.93 The bankruptcy trustee sued the company’s accounting firm and
the partner there responsible for compiling the financial statements for
malpractice and “deepening insolvency.”94 The district court entered summary
judgment for the defendants on both claims, and the trustee appealed.95 The
Third Circuit affirmed the district court.96
With respect to the malpractice claim, the trustee alleged that deepening
insolvency was a theory of damages in that the defendants “dramatically
deepened the insolvency of CitX, and wrongfully expanded the debt of CitX
and waste of its illegally raised capital, by permitting CitX to incur additional
debt” by compiling the fraudulent financial statements.97 The Third Circuit
thus had to decide if deepening insolvency is a viable damage theory in
negligence cases.98 Reviewing its decision in Lafferty, the court concluded that
it was not a viable damage theory.99 Nothing in Lafferty, the court stated,
should “be interpreted to create a novel theory of damages for an independent
cause of action like malpractice.”100 The court further explained that it did not
mean to imply by the quoted language that deepening insolvency was a valid
theory of damages in connection with other causes of action, such as fraud.101
As for deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action, the court
held “that a claim of negligence cannot sustain a deepening-insolvency cause
of action.”102 Deepening insolvency under Pennsylvania law requires
fraudulent conduct on the defendants’ part.103 Unfortunately, the court in In re

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2006).
See id. at 681.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.
In re CitX, 448 F.3d at 674.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re CitX, 448 F.3d at 681.
Id. at 677 n.8.
Id. at 681.
Id.
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CitX did not identify the elements of a fraud-based deepening insolvency
claim.
Lafferty and In re CitX aside, In re Exide Technologies, Inc.104 is another
case plaintiffs often cite for the proposition that deepening insolvency is an
independent cause of action. Exide Technologies stemmed from events leading
to the 2002 bankruptcy of the Exide Group (Exide).105 In 1997, various banks
established a $650 million credit facility for Exide.106 In 2000, these same
banks loaned Exide $250 million to acquire a competitor, GNB Dunlop.107
Exide’s financial condition deteriorated rapidly after it acquired GNB
Dunlop.108 In October 2001, the banks amended the loan documents in return
for liens on all of Exide’s foreign subsidiaries’ assets and capital stock.109 In
December 2001, the parties entered into a third amendment to their loan
agreement that granted the banks additional collateral and guarantees, and did
so in ways such that the transactions could not be challenged as preferential
transfers under federal bankruptcy law.110 During the time that these
amendments were being negotiated and executed, Exide suffered massive
losses and allegedly became more insolvent.111
The plaintiffs sued the lenders in January 2003. In the twelfth count of
their complaint, they pled a claim for deepening insolvency.112 The plaintiffs
alleged that the banks caused Exide to acquire GNB Dunlop so that they could
obtain the control necessary to force Exide to continue its business for nearly
two years at ever increasing levels of insolvency.113 The banks’ conduct
allegedly caused Exide “to suffer massive losses and become more deeply
insolvent, costing creditors substantial value.”114 The banks moved to dismiss,
asserting that deepening insolvency was not a recognized cause of action under
Delaware law, that the plaintiffs did not allege that the banks had committed an
actionable tort, that there was no allegation that the banks owed duties to Exide
or its creditors, that the plaintiffs had not pleaded fraud with requisite
particularity, and that the in pari delicto doctrine defeated the claim.115
The Exide Technologies court first had to determine whether deepening
insolvency was a valid claim under Delaware law.116 The court began its
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
In re Exide Techs., 299 B.R. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 750–51.
In re Exide Techs., 299 B.R. at 751.
Id.
Id.
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analysis by noting that because the Delaware Supreme Court had not spoken
on the tort of deepening insolvency, it would have to predict how Delaware’s
highest court would rule on the issue if given the chance.117 To do this, the
court was required to consider (1) statements by the Delaware Supreme Court
in related areas, (2) cases decided by Delaware’s intermediate courts, (3)
federal court cases interpreting Delaware law, and (4) decisions from other
jurisdictions discussing the issue.118 Because the first two categories yielded
no helpful authority, the court turned to federal cases analyzing state law, and
thus, to Lafferty.119 The Exide Technologies court cited and quoted Lafferty at
length in analyzing the plaintiffs’ deepening insolvency claim:
The Court of Appeals held that three factors “would persuade the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to recognize ‘deepening insolvency’” as giving rise to a
cognizable injury in the proper circumstances. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 352.
These factors were the: (1) soundness of the theory; (2) growing acceptance of
the theory among courts; and (3) remedial theme in Pennsylvania law (when
there is an injury). Id. The Court found that the theory of deepening
insolvency, particularly in the bankruptcy context, was a sound one. Id. at
349–50. Furthermore, the Court found that the “[g]rowing acceptance of the
deepening insolvency theory confirms its soundness.” Id. at 350. The Court
then cited numerous cases in which deepening insolvency was found to give
rise to a cognizable injury. Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 350–51. Finally, the court
determined that “one of the most venerable principles in Pennsylvania
jurisprudence, and in most common law jurisdictions for that matter is that,
120
where there is an injury, the law provides a remedy.” Id. at 351.

The court reasoned based on Lafferty that the first two elements, i.e., the
soundness of deepening insolvency theory and its growing judicial acceptance,
had been met.121 As for the third element, being the remedial theme of the
forum state’s law, the court observed that the Delaware Supreme Court had
stated that “the function of a damage award in civil litigation is to provide just
and full compensation to a plaintiff who suffers injury or loss by reason of the
conduct of the tortfeasor.”122 The court thus concluded, based on Lafferty and
Delaware’s remedial scheme, that the Delaware Supreme Court would
recognize a claim for deepening insolvency where there is damage to corporate
property.123 With respect to the defendants’ remaining arguments for

117. Id.
118. Id. at 751 (citing Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459–60 (3d Cir.
1993)).
119. In re Exide Techs., 299 B.R. at 751–52 (citing and discussing Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 752.
122. Id. (quoting Maier v. Santucci, 697 A.2d 747, 749 (Del. 1997)).
123. Id.
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dismissal, the court stated that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded their
deepening insolvency claim, leaving the other issues for another day.124
Exide Technologies is not at all persuasive. Although it may have been
true at the time the case was decided that some courts recognized deepening
insolvency as an independent cause of action, what about those that did not?125
What about courts that had recognized deepening insolvency only as a
damages theory?126 The Exide Technologies court stated that the Lafferty court
“cited numerous cases in which deepening insolvency was found to give rise to
a cognizable injury,”127 but of the seven cases the Lafferty court cited, three
recognized only that deepening insolvency is a theory of damages, and another
three involved New York law.128 “No reported New York case, however, has
ruled that ‘deepening insolvency’ is an independent tort.”129 How then did the
cases cited in Lafferty compel the conclusion that the Delaware Supreme Court
would recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action?
Given that the court was being called on to predict Delaware law, it should
have analyzed the decision in Lafferty as well as the cases the Third Circuit
cited; the Exide Technologies court specifically noted that in predicting
Delaware law it was required to “examine” decisions from other jurisdictions
discussing deepening insolvency.130 The term “examine” does not mean “read
uncritically” or “acknowledge and ignore,” nor in this context does it suggest
that a court should read only one case from another jurisdiction.
The Lafferty court was predicting Pennsylvania law; the Exide
Technologies court, being asked to predict Delaware law, was not obliged to
follow Lafferty simply because it was decided by the highest court in the same
judicial circuit. Indeed, because the court was predicting Delaware law,
special analytical care was in order.
The Exide Technologies court’s embrace of Delaware’s remedial scheme,
like the Lafferty court’s embrace of Pennsylvania’s remedial scheme, should
have caused the court to conclude that the plaintiffs’ deepening insolvency
claim was at most a theory of damages. The Delaware Supreme Court’s
statement that “the function of a damage award in civil litigation is to provide
124. See In re Exide Techs., 299 B.R. at 752.
125. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Ins. v. Chase Bank of Tex. Nat’l Ass’n, 274 F.3d 924, 935 (5th
Cir. 2001) (interpreting Texas law).
126. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983); Hannover Corp. of
Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854 (M.D. La. 1997); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re
Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 2001); Latin Inv. Corp. v. L
& L Constr. Assocs., Inc. (In re Latin Inv. Corp.), 168 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D.C. 1993).
127. In re Exide Techs., 299 B.R. 752, 752.
128. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 350–
51 (3d Cir. 2001).
129. Kittay v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 458 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004).
130. In re Exide Techs., 299 B.R. at 751.
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full and just compensation to a plaintiff who suffers injury or loss by reason of
the conduct of the tortfeasor” cannot be read to license the recognition of a
new cause of action, especially where the plaintiffs had pleaded eleven other
causes of action arising out of the same factual nucleus.131 Exide Technologies
is in all pertinent respects an analytical mess.
C. Rejecting Deepening Insolvency Theory
The best analysis of deepening insolvency theory is found in Kittay v.
Atlantic Bank of New York (In re Global Service Group LLC),132 decided under
New York law. In that case, Global Service Group filed for bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy trustee then sued Global’s insiders (the Goldmans and Cohen) and
Atlantic Bank. The trustee alleged that Global was insolvent, or nearly so, and
was undercapitalized from the time of its formation.133 The trustee further
alleged that Atlantic Bank knew, or should have known, of Global’s condition
but loaned it money anyway based on “its relationship with the Goldmans and
the strength of their personal assets.”134 Atlantic Bank’s willingness to extend
credit to Global influenced other creditors to do likewise.135 Long story short,
by extending credit to Global, Atlantic Bank allowed it to “prolong its
corporate existence and incur increased debt.”136
Similarly, the trustee alleged that the Goldmans and Cohen allowed Global
to do business while it was insolvent and undercapitalized.137 By prolonging
Global’s existence and continuing to incur debt, they deepened the company’s
insolvency and reduced creditors’ potential recovery from the bankruptcy
estate.138 The trustee alleged that the “expansion of Global’s debt was the
proximate cause of damage to Global and its creditors.”139
The defendants moved to dismiss the trustee’s complaint. One of the
issues was the trustee’s cause of action for deepening insolvency, which the
court described as “‘fraudulent prolongation of a corporation’s life beyond
insolvency,’ resulting in damage to the corporation caused by increased
debt.”140 The court carefully analyzed whether deepening insolvency should
be treated as a theory of damages or as an independent cause of action,141
noting in the process that New York case law suggested that deepening

131.
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134.
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136.
137.
138.
139.
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141.

See id. at 752 (quoting Maier v. Santucci, 697 A.2d 747, 749 (Del. 1997)).
316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 455–56.
Id.
In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 457–58.
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insolvency was a theory of damages resulting from the commission of a
separate tort, and observing that no reported New York decision had ever
suggested that deepening insolvency was an independent tort.142 In any event,
[t]he distinction between “deepening insolvency” as a tort or damage theory
may be one unnecessary to make. Prolonging an insolvent corporation’s life,
without more, will not result in liability under either approach. Instead, one
seeking to recover for “deepening insolvency” must show that the defendant
prolonged the company’s life in breach of a separate duty, or committed an
actionable tort that contributed to the continued operation of a corporation and
143
its increased debt.

Against this backdrop, the trustee’s deepening insolvency cause of action
fell short. The fact that Atlantic Bank made a loan to Global that it knew or
should have known the company could not repay may have been bad banking,
but it was not a tort.144 Lenders are not prohibited from extending credit to
insolvent companies; were that the case, most insolvent companies would be
forced to liquidate.145 As for the fact that Atlantic Bank loaned money to
Global based “on the strength of its relationship with the Goldmans and their
personal assets,” that was “neither surprising nor improper.”146 Banks prefer to
lend money to people they know, and they routinely insist on personal
guarantees and pledges of personal funds.147 Importantly, the trustee did not
allege that Atlantic Bank loaned money to Global for the purpose of allowing
the Goldmans to “siphon off” those funds or to engage in other wrongdoing.148
“The unspoken premise of the trustee’s ‘deepening insolvency’ theory
[was] that the managers of an insolvent” company have an “absolute duty” to
liquidate it, and that “anyone who knowingly extends credit to the insolvent
company breaches an independent duty in the nature of aiding and abetting the
managers’ wrongdoing.”149 This is a flawed assumption, as the In re Global
Service Group court properly noted.150
The directors and officers of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to both the
corporation and its shareholders.151 Once the corporation becomes insolvent,
their duties extend to creditors.152 At that point, “the directors and officers owe
duties to multiple constituencies whose interests may diverge,” and they are
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In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460.
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obligated to all concerned to act in good faith to maximize the corporation’s
long-term capacity for creating wealth.153 As a result,
[t]he fiduciaries of an insolvent business might well conclude that the company
should continue to operate in order to maximize its “long-term wealth creating
capacity,” or more generally, its enterprise value. In fact, chapter 11 [of the
Bankruptcy Code] is based on the accepted notion that a business is worth
more to everyone alive than dead. . . . [T]here is no absolute duty . . . to shut
down and liquidate an insolvent corporation. The fiduciaries may, consistent
with the business judgment rule, continue to operate the corporation’s
154
business.

In short, directors’ and officers’ negligent but good faith decision to operate an
insolvent business will not expose them to liability on a deepening insolvency
theory.155
To overcome the business judgment rule,156 a plaintiff must specifically
allege that directors acted in bad faith or with fraudulent intent.157 Although
the trustee alleged elsewhere in the complaint that the Goldmans were engaged
in self-dealing, he did not allege that Global’s insiders prolonged the
company’s existence to misappropriate loan proceeds.158 The trustee’s
incorrect assumption that merely prolonging the existence of an insolvent
corporation and thereby incurring additional debt and stating a claim for relief
was fatal.159
The In re Global Service Group court further noted that the trustee’s
complaint failed to allege proximate cause.160 The trustee’s allegation that but
for Atlantic Bank’s loans Global would have liquidated before its insolvency
deepened was insufficient.161 The gravamen of the trustee’s case was that the
Goldmans had received fraudulent transfers from Global and that they used
some of the Atlantic Bank loan proceeds in their scheme.162 But while it
arguably was foreseeable that the Atlantic Bank loans would permit Global to
153. Id. (quoting Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A.
No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)).
154. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
155. Id. at 461.
156. “The business judgment rule ‘is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’” Official Comm. of Subordinated
Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
157. In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 461.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 461.
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continue doing business, there were no facts suggesting that Atlantic Bank
could have foreseen that the Goldmans would misappropriate loan proceeds or
operate their insolvent business for an improper purpose.163 The court
therefore dismissed the trustee’s deepening insolvency claim.164
In re Global Service Group is well reasoned and courts should follow it, as
some already have.165 The court made several points worth remembering.
First, “deepening insolvency” may be nothing more than a statement of
corporate condition.166 The directors and officers of a company may have to
operate through desperately lean times if the company is to recognize its longterm financial potential.167 “A firm still can be economically viable even if it
is insolvent.”168 This is well evidenced by the Bankruptcy Code itself, which
permits bankrupt businesses to pursue rehabilitation (which necessarily entails
deepening insolvency) rather than liquidating.169 Second, no matter how
deepening insolvency theory may be described, it must be tempered by and
subject to the business judgment rule.170 Courts following that rule uphold
corporate directors’ decisions so long as they reflect rational business
purposes.171 By logical extension, because a corporation’s lawyers are its
agents,172 lawyers should not face liability on a deepening insolvency theory
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 641–46 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (finding
that Supreme Court of Texas would not recognize deepening insolvency as a cause of action);
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, C.A. No. 1571-N, 2006 WL 2434228, at *28–
30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action
and citing In re Global Services Group among other cases).
166. See In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460 n.7.
167. See id.
168. Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498 (1993).
169. Bates, supra note 60, at 60; see also Elizabeth M. Bohn, Time to Reorganize: But How?,
BUS. LAW TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 43, 44 (explaining that it is a core bankruptcy principle
that preserving a business rather than liquidating it is usually in the best interests of the
company’s creditors, employees, and business partners).
170. See In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460.
171. Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated
Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t
Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
172. The attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship. See, e.g., Wentland v. Wass,
25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Schafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss,
Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)); Seaboard Sur. Co. v.
Boney, 761 A.2d 985, 989, 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Multilist Serv. of Cape Girardeau,
Mo., Inc. v. Wilson, 14 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Crane Creek Ranch, Inc. v.
Cresap, 103 P.3d 535, 537 (Mont. 2004); Daniel v. Moore, 596 S.E.2d 465, 469 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (quoting Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 463 S.E.2d 397, 400 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)); State ex
rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Taylor, 4 P.3d 1242, 1253 n.39 (Okla. 2000); McBurney v. Roszkowski,
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for assisting or implementing the legitimate business decisions of the directors
and officers of an insolvent company. Third, deepening insolvency theory
should at most be considered to express a category or type of damages awarded
only upon proof of a separate tort, typically a species of fraud or closely linked
to fraudulent conduct.173
II. THE LEGAL VIABILITY OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY CLAIMS
When a deepening insolvency claim looms, the entity involved typically is
in bankruptcy or receivership, and a trustee or receiver is administering the
entity or its estate with a principal goal of maximizing its value. Achieving
this goal enhances the company’s chances to reorganize and operate
successfully going forward or, at a minimum, increases disbursements to
creditors and shareholders. Consequently, trustees and receivers frequently
scrutinize as a potential source of recovery the failed company’s fiduciaries,
including lawyers who advised and assisted the company while it was in the
zone of insolvency.174
The issue here is whether and when deepening insolvency theory is a valid
arrow in a trustee’s or receiver’s quiver. Unlike claims for legal malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting fraud or breach of fiduciary
duty, deepening insolvency lacks the definition of elements essential to
independent causes of action.175 Even as a damages theory, deepening
insolvency generally suffers from unprovable causation and fatally imprecise
elements. For example, a company’s mere increase in debt is not an economic
injury.176 Only if company insiders loot the new loan proceeds does the
increased debt load become a damages factor, and even there the harm is
attributable to the looting, not the borrowing.177 The fact that a company’s
deepening insolvency may shake creditors’ confidence, and thus impair the
company’s assets, is likewise no basis for assessing damages because
deepening insolvency involves the fraudulent prolonging of an entity’s
existence through the concealment of its true financial condition, meaning that
“no one’s confidence will be shaken because no one knows that bankruptcy

875 A.2d 428, 437 (R.I. 2005) (quoting State v. Cline, 405 A.2d 1192, 1199 (R.I. 1979)); Hill &
Griffith Co. v. Bryant, 139 S.W.3d 688, 696 (Tex. App. 2004).
173. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop.
(In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
174. See Brighton, supra note 13, at 34 (noting that deepening insolvency claims are
commonly asserted against an insolvent company’s accountants, investment advisers, and
lawyers); J.B. Heaton, Deepening Insolvency, 30 J. CORP. L. 465, 470 (2005) (stating that a
defunct corporation’s professional service firms often are “preferred targets” in litigation).
175. See In re Vartec Telecom, 335 B.R. at 645 (“If ‘deepening insolvency’ were a tort, what
would its elements be?”).
176. Bates, supra note 60, at 60.
177. Id.
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beckons.”178 Nonetheless, if it is anything other than a catch phrase, deepening
insolvency is recognizable only as a limited theory of damages in narrow
circumstances.
A.

Deepening Insolvency Should Be Judicially Recognized Only in Limited
Circumstances

In the face of severe financial challenges, corporate fiduciaries must strive
to maximize a company’s “economic value.”179 To this end, corporate
directors and officers often undertake, with the assistance of lawyers and other
professionals, efforts intended—but not ensured—to increase revenue and to
enhance assets or reduce liabilities. But no matter how well planned or well
intentioned, such efforts are inevitably risk-laden.180 Even the most carefully
designed and executed efforts carry the very real possibility that the endeavor
may fail. When that occurs, the company may be deeper in debt; it may
experience decreased profitability and value; it may be faced with additional
expenses; it may be constrained by operational limitations; and it may suffer
strained relationships with creditors, customers, lenders and other outsiders
critical to its business. Even when such risks materialize, however, they do not
necessarily evidence corporate malfeasance for which those acting on the
company’s behalf or counseling it should be liable.
It is only where corporate fiduciaries and the outside professionals
assisting them have acted fraudulently to plunge the company further into
insolvency in breach of their fiduciary duties that deepening insolvency theory
may properly attach.181 Bad faith, personal benefit, and complicity with
culpable corporate fiduciaries are indispensable requirements. Otherwise,
lawyers, their corporate clients’ officers and directors, and other professionals
may believe that liquidation is the only safe alternative for a company facing

178. Id.
179. Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004).
180. Courts fashioned the business judgment rule to address precisely this hazard, as it
recognizes the need for corporate officers and directors to take reasoned risks to promote a
company’s interest in the absence of perfect certainty as to the potential success of the effort. See
Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated Res., Inc.),
147 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
181. A useful example of the limited conduct that should be actionable and incorporate
deepening insolvency as a theory of damages may be found in Production Resources Group, LLC
v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). There, the defendant allegedly diverted funds
to favor a particular creditor related to the company’s insiders. Id. at 780. Although the company
continued to operate and pay hefty salaries to insiders, it claimed to be insolvent, refused to hold
an annual meeting, and issued shares to raise capital outside avenues permitted by the SEC. Id. at
774–81. While this case did not involve outside professionals, it arguably models the type of
conflict-of-interest laden conduct suitable for damages based on deepening insolvency theory.
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severe financial challenges.182 To retain lawyers’ incentives to provide the
expertise that distressed companies require, any rational liability regime must
not punish bona fide attempts to salvage value.
A claim for deepening insolvency must not serve as a vehicle for a 20/20
hindsight evaluation of either the prudence of corporate decision-making or the
ultimate perfection of legal advice given a corporate client. Instead, a
deepening insolvency claim must be sustainable only on the recognition that a
“fraudulent and concealed incurrence of debt can damage [corporate]
value . . . .”183 Only such fraud-based requirements184 duly recognize the
delicate tensions facing corporate fiduciaries and counsel attempting to steer a
company out of rough financial waters. Only such limited availability of
deepening insolvency theory can ensure that proper incentives exist to
encourage qualified lawyers to continue to provide their expert services in a
manner that is truly in the organizational client’s best interests.
B.

An Independent Deepening Insolvency Claim Adds Nothing

Deepening insolvency is an increasingly popular cause of action. But on
close scrutiny, deepening insolvency theory—lacking any definition—adds
nothing to the gallery of established torts that have traditionally played
important roles in holding professionals and other corporate fiduciaries
responsible for fraudulent conduct.185 For this simple reason alone, efforts to
establish a deepening insolvency cause of action should cease.186
182. See Jay R. Bender, Deepening Insolvency in Alabama: Is It A Tort, A Damages Theory
or Neither of the Above?, 66 ALA. LAW. 190, 198–99 (2005) (explaining that recognizing
deepening insolvency as a cause of action or damage theory is bad policy because it deters
legitimate corporate restructurings, discourages banks from entering into consensual workout
agreements, and, thus, encourages premature business liquidations).
183. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 349 (3d
Cir. 2001).
184. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitxX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672, 680–
81 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that negligence will not support a deepening insolvency cause of
action; fraud is required); OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood
Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 534 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“The plaintiff, therefore, is required to
show fraudulent conduct—not mere negligence.”); Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Monahan
Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 39–40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that deepening
insolvency theory is based on fraud); Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Fin.
Corp.), 335 B.R. 539, 548 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (“In order to state a claim for deepening
insolvency, then, the trustee of a bankrupt debtor must allege that the defendant defrauded the
debtor.”); Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2005); see also Devon Mobile Commc’ns Liquidating Trust v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 324 B.R. 492, 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (recognizing that a valid
claim for deepening insolvency requires that the defendant have “wrongfully” prolonged the life
of the now-insolvent entity).
185. See, e.g., Bondi v. Grant Thornton Int’l (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 377 F. Supp. 2d 390,
419 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing deepening insolvency claims against accounting firms as
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The duplicative nature, and thus worthlessness, of deepening insolvency
theory is illustrated by the decision in Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty.
Hosp. Corp.).187 In that adversary action against a defunct corporation’s
officers and directors and its former law firms, Epstein, Becker & Green and
Kutak Rock, LLP, the court rejected deepening insolvency as a tort cause of
action on the ground that it duplicates several recognized causes of action,
including breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, and legal malpractice.188 “There is no point in recognizing and
adjudicating ‘new’ causes of action,” the court correctly reasoned, “when
established ones cover the same ground.”189 Similarly, a bankruptcy court in
Texas rejected deepening insolvency as a cause of action because it is
“substantially duplicated by torts already established in Texas.”190
1.

Legal Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Sufficiently
Police the Attorney-Client Relationship

When a lawyer fails to properly exercise her duty of care to the client and
that failure leads to the client’s injury, the lawyer may be liable for
malpractice. In general, a claim for legal malpractice requires: (1) an attorneyclient relationship giving rise to a duty; (2) a violation or breach of duty by the
attorney; (3) a breach of duty as a proximate cause of injury to the client; and
(4) actual injury, loss or damage sustained by the client.191
In addition to being obligated to conduct themselves in a competent and
diligent manner reasonably calculated to promote the client’s interests—
obligations enforceable via a legal malpractice claim—lawyers also owe
certain fiduciary duties to their clients, the violation of which may give rise to
duplicating malpractice claims); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005)
(finding that Texas would not recognize deepening insolvency as an independent tort “because
the injury caused by the deepening of a corporation’s insolvency is substantially duplicated by
torts already established . . .”).
186. Courts have declined to allow causes of action that are mere “disguises” of one another
to proceed. See Gen. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, Coyne & Savits, LLP, 357 F. Supp. 2d 951, 961–62
(E.D. Va. 2005).
187. Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp.), 333 B.R. 506 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2005).
188. Id. at 516–17.
189. Id. at 517.
190. In re Vartec Telecom, Inc., 335 B.R. at 644 (footnote omitted).
191. See Spur Prods. Corp. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 122 P.3d 300, 303 (Idaho 2005) (quoting
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96 P.3d 623, 627 (Idaho 2004)); N. Ill. Emergency Physicians v.
Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 837 N.E.2d 99, 106 (Ill. 2005); Stephens v. Denison, 150
S.W.3d 80, 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Jerry’s Enters., Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren,
Ltd., 691 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 117 P.3d 227,
236 n.16 (Nev. 2005); Tolpo v. Decordova, 146 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. App. 2004); Cox v.
Geary, 624 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 2006) (quoting Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C.,
568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Va. 2002)).
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liability.192 Lawyers must maintain client confidences and property, avoid
impermissible conflicts of interest, deal honestly with the client, and refrain
from taking advantage of information in a manner adverse to the client.193 In
short, lawyers owe their clients two basic fiduciary obligations: confidentiality
and undivided loyalty.194 Where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty exists
independently of a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff attempting to recover
must prove: (1) there existed a lawyer-client relationship such that the lawyer
was acting as a fiduciary for the client; (2) the lawyer breached a fiduciary
duty to the client; (3) the client incurred injury; and (4) the lawyer’s breach of
fiduciary duty was the proximate cause of the client’s injury.195 As a result, a
lawyer’s liability will turn on a particularized showing that he engaged in badfaith, fraudulent, and self-enriching dealings at the client’s expense.196
A legally cognizable deepening insolvency claim, properly analyzed,
would require proof that the lawyer acted in a fraudulent manner or engaged in
other misconduct in violation of the lawyer’s professional duties to the
corporate client, and that this conduct proximately caused an increase in the
client’s indebtedness.197 Recovery would further require that the increased
debt constituted an actual, ascertainable injury to the client.198 Although
labeled differently, a deepening insolvency claim equates with claims for legal
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. Efforts to prosecute a deepening
insolvency claim against lawyers would thus necessarily turn on these same
showings, although no court has so clearly defined such a claim.
2.

Deepening Insolvency Claims Are Likewise Redundant of Aiding and
Abetting Claims

Similarly, an independent claim for deepening insolvency asserted against
a lawyer by a third party is indistinguishable from a claim for aiding and
abetting fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, or other misconduct by a

192. See generally 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§
14.1, 14.2 (2005) (discussing lawyers’ fiduciary duties and cause of action for their breach).
193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 50, 52 (2000)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
194. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 192, § 14.1 at 485.
195. See, e.g., Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 772 (S.D. 2002); Bennett v.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 27 (Utah 2003).
196. See Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(discussing the fraud-based threshold that directorial conduct must surpass in order for breach of
fiduciary duty claims against directors to survive).
197. Kittay v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 458–59
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
198. See Corp. Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multi-Service Aviation Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-3020,
2004 WL 1900001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2004).
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corporation’s officers and directors.199 Claims against lawyers for aiding and
abetting the tortious conduct of corporate fiduciaries200 are equally premised
on a lawyer’s bad faith conduct.201 Aiding and abetting claims effectively
charge lawyers with knowingly participating in primary violators’ tortious
acts.202 For aiding and abetting liability to attach, there must be some violation
by a corporate fiduciary. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the lawyer had
199. See Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as an independent tort under North
Carolina law because “North Carolina already imposes on every person a duty not to aid and abet
a breach of fiduciary duty by another”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec
Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 641–46
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency theory as duplicating established torts);
In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 461–62 (discussing overlap between trustee’s deepening
insolvency and aiding and abetting claims, and dismissing aiding and abetting claim).
200. An officer or director’s fiduciary duties to the corporation include good faith, due care,
and loyalty. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,
10 (Del. 1998); see 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994). The duty of good faith may be breached if an officer
engages in knowingly illegal conduct that exposes the corporation to harm. In re Caremark Int’l
Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966–70 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also 2 AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 at 8-200–201 (3d ed. Supp. 2005). The duty of care may be
breached if an officer fails to consider all material information reasonably available in the course
of making a decision. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000). The duty of loyalty
prevents an officer from deriving an improper personal benefit at the company’s expense through
self-dealing. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del.
1988).
201. A claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is not available in all
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d
325, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing California civil conspiracy law). In addition, under the
Wagoner doctrine, an officer’s wrongful conduct is imputed to a corporation, in which case the
corporation will either lack standing to bring an aiding and abetting claim against a third party, or
the corporation’s assertion of such a claim will be subject to the defense that the corporation is in
pari delicto. See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 117–20 (2d Cir.
1991); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Investcorp S.A., 80 F. Supp.
2d 129, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). There are two recognized exceptions to the Wagoner rule: (1)
where the officers of the corporation acted with an adverse interest to the corporation, abandoning
the interests of the company; or (2) where there was an innocent decision-maker within the debtor
corporation that could have prevented the misconduct of the officers and directors. See Smith v.
Andersen LLP, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199–1200 (D. Ariz. 2001). Under these circumstances, a
claim against a lawyer for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty would be viable. Id. at
1200.
202. See, e.g., Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 255–56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (alleging
that lawyer aided and abetted breach of fiduciary duty by company president); Thornwood, Inc. v.
Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768–69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (alleging that lawyers aided and
abetted breach of fiduciary duty by partner); Exposition Partner, LLP v. King, LeBlanc & Bland,
LLP, 869 So. 2d 934, 942–44 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (aiding and abetting fraud); Chem-Age Indus.,
Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 773–76 (S.D. 2002) (alleging that lawyer aided and abetted
breach of fiduciary duty).
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actual knowledge of the wrongful conduct and provided substantial
assistance203 in furtherance of that conduct.204 Such strict evidentiary
requisites are both necessary and appropriate for potential liability to attach in
the absence of an attorney-client relationship. Prosecution of an independent
claim based on deepening insolvency theory can require no less.
Consequently, recognizing deepening insolvency as an independent cause
of action only litters established tort law with a poorly-defined, redundant
cause of action.205 Some might argue that this redundancy is harmless. In fact,
the harm is immediate and expensive both in terms of actual costs incurred in
either prosecuting or defending such a claim, and in terms of the social and
judicial costs.
C. The Business Judgment Rule as a Valid Defense Against Deepening
Insolvency Claims
Whether deepening insolvency is asserted as an independent cause of
action or as a damage theory, lawyers defending against such allegations must
be permitted a business judgment rule defense. Based on the very nature of
their roles as counselors and advisors, lawyers will not have made the business
decisions or exercised the business judgment that occasioned the company’s
failure. Lawyers are their clients’ agents; it is their responsibility to carry out
their clients’ lawful instructions, not to chart their own course. Yet, those
business decisions—rather than merely the lawyers’ conduct—are at the center
of the evidence that must be litigated. The business judgment rule forces
plaintiffs attacking corporate decisions to address the manner in which they
were made, rather than whether they proved to be correct. The business
judgment rule also requires plaintiffs to overcome a strong presumption against
second-guessing the decisions made. As a consequence, the rule can be a
robust tool in providing counsel assisting insolvent companies with the
203. See Kolbeck v. LIT Am., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). This substantial
assistance requirement implicitly incorporates an element of causation, requiring a showing that
the aiding and abetting conduct “proximately caused the harm on which the primary liability is
predicated.” Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
205. See Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Pamalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601–
02 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing deepening insolvency claim as duplicative of breach of fiduciary
duty claim); Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 333 B.R. 506, 517 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 2005) (discussing deepening insolvency, the court reasoned that “[t]here is no point in
recognizing and adjudicating ‘new’ causes of action when established ones cover the same
ground”); Rafool v. Goldfarb Corp. (In re Fleming Packaging Corp.), No. 03-82408, 04-8166,
2005 WL 2205703, at *10 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2005) (noting that directors’ fiduciary duties
clearly prohibit the type of conduct on which deepening insolvency claims are based); Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec
Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency
theory as duplicative of established torts).
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freedom needed to act in furtherance of companies’ best interests.206 This is
true even when decisions or selected courses of action may be deemed risky or
outside the bounds of traditionally accepted conduct.207
To conform a lawyer’s standard of conduct to that which exists for
purposes of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the business
judgment rule must be a defense to deepening insolvency claims. Recognizing
this defense better mitigates the risks lawyers face and provides the proper
incentives for lawyers to assist financially distressed companies.
The business judgment rule manifests the basic tenet of corporate law that
corporate officers and directors must prudently manage the company’s affairs,
but they are not obligated to avoid all risks. Indeed, a “principal justification”
for the rule is to “cause corporations to take on business risks.”208
Accordingly, the rule creates a presumption that “in making business decisions
not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in
the corporation’s best interest.”209 The rule safeguards directors and officers
from liability when certain corporate decisions turn out to be unprofitable or
harmful,
unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision,
do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational
business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that
210
includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.

Corporate decisions carried out by a fiduciary within her corporate authority,
in good faith, with due care,211 and for a rational business purpose212 cannot

206. See 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 18–19 (5th ed. 1998).
207. Id. at 84–85 (discussing the abuse of discretion standard which provides “broad latitude”
to directors).
208. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business
Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870 (2005) (discussing Prof.
Lyman P.Q. Johnson’s recognition of a principal justification for the business judgment rule).
209. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 212 (8th ed. 2004). Delaware courts, frequently the forum
for significant corporate litigation, recognize that a decision by a board of directors (1) in which
the directors possess no direct or indirect personal interest, (2) that is made (a) with reasonable
awareness of all reasonably available material information and (b) after prudent consideration of
the alternatives, and (3) which is in good faith furtherance of a rational corporate purpose, will
not be interfered with by the courts, either prospectively by injunction or retrospectively by
imposition of liability for damages upon the directors, even if the decision appears to have been
unwise or have caused loss to the corporation or its stockholders. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d
85, 90–91 (Del. 2001); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000).
210. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).
211. The business judgment rule focuses the duty of care analysis of a business decision
primarily on the process by which the decision was reached; that is, whether the defendants
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thus be questioned with hindsight for liability purposes. This fact was recently
underscored in a deepening insolvency case filed against bankers and various
managers of a bankrupt corporation, where the court noted that under the
business judgment rule, “a manager’s negligent but good faith decision to
operate an insolvent business will not subject him to liability for ‘deepening
insolvency.’”213
Where a plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption set forth in the
business judgment rule by showing that the corporate decision was not made
with due care, in good faith, or with a rational business purpose, the judicial
deference permitted to the fiduciary dissolves. The burden shifts to the
fiduciary to prove the fairness of the challenged decision.214
The same presumptive protections supplied by the business judgment rule
must play a role in deepening insolvency litigation against lawyers, as the rule
recognizes “that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate
corporate business decisions.”215 The role of a lawyer assisting an insolvent
corporation is to promote the corporation’s best interests within the limits of
the lawyer’s engagement. In doing so, a lawyer is forced to give advice and
make recommendations based on less-than-perfect information and must often
do so urgently. In these circumstances, the lawyer’s role is to provide prudent
and reasoned advice that promotes the corporation’s interests, whether those
interests are best served by bankruptcy or by entering into risk-laden ventures
that may prove beneficial to the company.216 Where corporate fiduciaries that

considered all material information reasonably available. The rule deflects attention away from
the substance of the decision itself (e.g., whether a reasonably careful or risk free course of action
was selected), thereby imposing a control for hindsight bias. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264
(“Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if they
are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decision-making context is process due care
only.”). In other words, where the business judgment rule applies, the duty of care may be
characterized as simply a duty to exercise informed business judgment. In some jurisdictions, the
adequacy of the decision-making process is measured by concepts of gross negligence. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
212. Transactions designed to disguise a corporation’s insolvency so that it may continue to
conduct business untainted would not constitute a legitimate business purpose. See Amfesco
Indus., Inc. v. Greenblatt, 568 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
213. Kittay v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 461 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004).
214. See Croton River Club, Inc. v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. (In re Croton
River Club), 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995); Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 91; McMullin, 765
A.2d at 917.
215. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); see Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT
Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 (Del. Ch. 2004).
216. If the business judgment rule is deemed inapplicable to deepening insolvency claims
against lawyers, the effect is to impose on lawyers who advise companies in the zone of
insolvency an absolute incentive to counsel in favor of liquidation. There is no such duty under
American law. Instead, fiduciaries are obligated to make a good faith effort to maximize the
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approve the advice provided by a lawyer before any action is taken are
protected against liability for corporate harm caused by their own mistakes of
judgment, the lawyer providing the advice deserves the same protection. The
lawyer cannot be left to suffer as the scapegoat. The business judgment rule
would not preclude recovery where a lawyer advising a corporation conducts
herself in a fraudulent or self-interested manner.217 Application of the rule,
however, would better refine any valid theory of liability or recovery to impose
liability on truly culpable counsel rather than punishing counsel for their mere
inability to predict the future.
Essential to any analysis of whether lawyers deserve business judgment
rule protection is an understanding of the contours of lawyers’ duties when
representing a company in the zone of insolvency. Like corporate officers and
directors, lawyers may never be judged by whether their conduct, decisions, or
advice met some intangible standard of perfection or absolute correctness.
Instead, and again like corporate officers and directors, lawyers are required to
conform their conduct so that it does not fall below a certain standard of care,
as reflected by the care and diligence exercised in settling on the conduct,
decisions, or advice at issue. Accordingly, deepening insolvency claims
against lawyers masquerade as malpractice claims attacking the underlying
business decisions affected by the lawyers’ conduct, decisions, or advice.
Indeed, deepening insolvency claims against lawyers often are made when
corporate officers and directors are for some reason judgment-proof.
Deepening insolvency theory thus extends lawyers’ liability to business
decisions, even in the absence of the decision makers.
As a result, lawyers should receive the same business judgment rule shelter
that corporate officers and directors receive, so long as the lawyers’ advice,
conduct, or decisions reflect honest and reasoned analysis, rather than
dishonesty and self-dealing. There is no reason to distinguish between a
company’s leaders and its lawyers in the deepening insolvency context.
Fairly allocating liability for misconduct connected to a company’s
deepening insolvency also requires recognizing that lawyers, like courts, do
not make business decisions and are not positioned to second guess the
business leaders who do. This aversion to second-guessing is a central premise

corporation’s long-term wealth-creating capacity. In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460
(quoting Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)). Maximizing a corporation’s wealth-creating
capacity may well entail taking current risks in favor of long-term growth. In fact, this duty of
corporate fiduciaries to salvage a corporation is written into bankruptcy law in the form of
Chapter 11, whose construct is based on the concept that a business is more valuable alive than
dead. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc. v. Beckhoff
(In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc.), Nos. 01–11457 through 01–11469(ALG), 2003 WL
22989669, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003).
217. See In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, 2003 WL 22989669, at *9–10.
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for the business judgment rule. In addition, if deepening insolvency theory is
intended to penalize lawyers for fraudulently prolonging a company’s life, then
lawyers are entitled to a corresponding framework for analyzing risks
attending their advice. The business judgment rule provides predictability.
Insofar as lawyers go, the rule deters misconduct while minimizing artificial
disincentives to entrepreneurial risk taking, to independent decision making,
and to representing distressed clients in desperate need of good counsel.
Application of the business judgment rule as a defense to a deepening
insolvency claim allows courts to properly penalize attorney conduct on the
fringes. By better defining the lawyer liability regime, the relevant inquiries
for plaintiffs and their counsel can have a more relevant and more precise
focus. For instance, where the business judgment rule plays a role, a
deepening insolvency claim against a lawyer must be premised on a transaction
that was arranged so improvidently and in such a risky, unusual, or
unnecessary manner as to offend fundamental legal practices. The query must
turn on whether there existed any sound reasons for structuring and conducting
the transaction as it was, thereby encouraging lawyers to provide well-reasoned
and justifiable counsel to their clients.
In addition, given that a corporation on the brink of insolvency may owe
duties to groups that are both internally and comparatively diverse, such as
shareholders and creditors,218 lawyers advising the corporation must be
protected from these non-homogeneous interests where their advice was given
in good faith, with due care, and in furtherance of a rational business purpose.
The lack of such a shield hazards the imposition of contradicting duties on
fiduciaries.
D. The Necessity to Establish Causation Is a Significant Obstacle to the
Thoughtful Application of Deepening Insolvency Theory
A deepening insolvency claim effectively alleges that the lawyer
participated in certain matters, failed to prevent the client from making certain
business decisions, or failed to share particular information concerning the
company’s financial condition with certain players.219 This conduct, according
to typical allegations, assisted the allegedly culpable corporate fiduciaries in
further depleting the client’s assets and driving it deeper into insolvency.220 It
is plain that this theory suffers from a fatal inability to establish that the
lawyer’s conduct proximately caused the corporation’s alleged injuries.

218. See Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch.
2004); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
219. See, e.g., Complaint at 42–44, Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Fin.
Corp.), 335 R.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (No. 02-11620-JBR).
220. See, e.g., id. at 43.
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Proximate cause is an essential element of all tort claims. To demonstrate
proximate cause, the “mere possibility of causation” is insufficient, and a
plaintiff must “introduce evidence that allows for the reasonable conclusion
that it is more likely than not that a defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
injury.”221 Under the traditional conception of proximate causation, if the
alleged injury would have occurred without the lawyer’s alleged misconduct, a
plaintiff cannot show that the lawyer’s conduct proximately caused the
injury.222
By requiring proof that but for a defendant attorney’s malpractice a
plaintiff would have experienced a more favorable outcome, the proximate
cause element of legal malpractice theory prevents “speculative and
conjectural claims” and “serves the essential purpose of ensuring that damages
awarded for [an] attorney’s malpractice actually have been caused by the
malpractice.”223 The importance of establishing proximate cause is heightened
in a deepening insolvency case, where multiple factors surely contributed to
the company’s downfall and the lawyers are convenient scapegoats for their
client’s business misjudgments.224
Given the many factors that combine to produce corporate success or
failure, the notion that a corporation’s demise could have been averted or that
its ultimate insolvency could have been materially lessened but for a lawyer’s
alleged negligence generally defies logic. Lawyers are not guarantors of their
clients’ business judgment. A lawyer does not have the ability to compel a
company’s officers or directors to pursue a particular course of action.225 This
fact alone will in most cases turn causation into speculation and thus defeat a
plaintiff’s claim.
The long and the short of it is that absent exceptional circumstances
involving fraud or similar misconduct, a bankruptcy trustee or other
representative of an insolvent entity will simply be unable to eliminate with
sufficient certainty the effect of other factors contributing to the company’s

221. Pettigrew v. Citizens Trust Bank, 229 B.R. 39, 42 (N.D. Ga. 1998); see Holmes v.
Peebles, 554 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga. App. 2001).
222. See Ogletree v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 535 S.E. 2d 545, 548 (Ga. App. 2000);
Houston v. Surrett, 474 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ga. App. 1996).
223. Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Cal. 2003).
224. See id. at 1051–52 (quoting John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An
Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and Threatening Flood, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1127, 1154–55
(1988)).
225. Cf. Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453, 455, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(noting that single director lacked the ability to “effect a rescue or pull the plug” as struggling
company attempted to deal with tax delinquency, such that bankruptcy trustee could not establish
causation in action against accountants).
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demise.226
Such additional factors may include economic conditions,
competitive forces, governmental action, and fundamental aspects of the
business at issue such as operating or production costs, financing costs, and the
like.227 Of course, a lawyer cannot be held liable for injuries caused by other
forces or the actions of others.228
Thus, absent fraudulent conduct involving significant self-dealing, a
lawyer’s advice concerning a particular transaction or business strategy simply
cannot be the proximate cause of a company’s deepening insolvency. In
addition, unless no participant other than the lawyer knew of the corporation’s
financial condition, or all other key decision-makers lacked substantial critical
information, the plaintiff cannot show that a lawyer’s alleged misconduct
specifically delayed the corporation’s decision to dissolve.
Tort claims also carry an element of foreseeability. The concept of
foreseeability eliminates a defendant’s liability for damages that are remote,
speculative, or unconnected to the alleged tort.229 To this end, certain conduct
can be the proximate cause of injury if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the
actor could have foreseen or anticipated that some injury might result.230 A
defendant is not liable if “the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury are
too remote for the law to countenance recovery.”231
A plaintiff alleging deepening insolvency must therefore show that it was
reasonably foreseeable to the lawyers that their services would result in losses
of the type sustained. So long as the facts do not evidence fraud, self-dealing,
or conflicts of interest on the lawyers’ part, the evidence cannot lead to a
rational conclusion that the lawyers should have foreseen that their advice
226. See id. at 455, 456–58 (observing that “[b]ad luck both at the company itself and in its
market, and perhaps bad management, brought about the losses,” and ultimately rejecting
trusteee’s claim).
227. Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1985)
(discussing trustee’s failure to demonstrate causation in securities fraud case); AUSA Life Ins.
Co. v. Ernst & Young, 119 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the many factors
that accountants could not have anticipated that affected client’s business, including company’s
unwise acquisition of a failing business, the fact that the company would be hit with a devastating
price war, the fact that key executives would leave and that office costs and new store leases
would soar, or that the company’s business would be harmed by a sharp drop in commercial
construction).
228. See Hicks, M.D. v. Talbott Recovery Sys., Inc., 196 F.3d 1226, 1243 (11th Cir. 1999)
(discussing intervening causes generally) (quoting Harrison v. Jenkins, 510 S.E.2d 345, 346 (Ga.
App. 1998)); Drabkin, 905 F.2d at 457 (discussing trustee’s failure to establish causation);
Walker v. Hammock, 541 S.E.2d 439, 441 (Ga. App. 2000) (explaining when intervening acts
defeat causation).
229. See WM. LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 43, at 280–81 (5th ed. 1984).
230. See Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1176–77 (D. Kan. 1992).
231. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.A. v. Coleman, 398 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga.
1990).
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would lead the corporation deeper into debt. In addition, foreseeability “turns
on fairness, policy, and . . . a rough sense of justice. A reasonably foreseeable
act might well be regarded as an act that a reasonable person who knew
everything that the defendant knew at the time would have been able to know
in advance with a fair degree of probability.”232 When lawyers provide
services, they do not guarantee success, but attempt only to contribute to the
client’s chances of success. Thus, lawyers acting in line with their ethical and
professional mandates cannot be said to have foreseen an injury if the business
fails.
In short, to promote fairness and the needed incentives for appropriate
legal and business ingenuity and risk-taking, foreseeability must be assessed in
the pragmatic context of lawyers’ duties. It is only when a lawyer acts outside
these bounds that foreseeability may be proven.233
E.

Deepening Insolvency Theory Inherently Relies Upon Speculative
Damages Allegations

The causation and foreseeability problems that plague deepening
insolvency claims lead to alleged damages that are speculative or remote and
hence not recoverable. A plaintiff may not recover for damages that are
merely a possible result of an act, or that are traceable to the act but are not its
legal or natural consequence. Rather, a plaintiff may seek only those damages
that she can prove to have been the legal and natural result of the act done.234
The damages sought under deepening insolvency theory cannot meet this
standard. Such claims against lawyers cannot distinguish with credibility or
the necessary level of certainty whether other factors caused the injury alleged
or what portion of the injury was a direct result of the lawyers’ fraudulent
conduct. Likewise, any assertion that an absence of the conduct would have
steered the corporation away from insolvency is speculative, as is any assertion
that other opportunities or destructive events would not have come to pass
even had the transaction at issue not occurred. Speculation may not form the
basis of a cognizable claim for damages.
Furthermore, any damages calculation based on deepening insolvency
relies on a multitude of inconstant variables and cannot be sufficiently specific.
Again, “mere speculation of a loss resulting from an attorney’s alleged [acts
232. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal
citations omitted).
233. See Lytle v. McClain, No. 03CA008400, 2004 WL 1932975, at *3–4 (Ohio App. Sept. 1,
2004) (explaining that lawyer acted within accepted bounds of conduct and that damages
resulting from client’s intervening conduct were not foreseeable for purposes of legal malpractice
claim).
234. See Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 853 F. Supp. 1422, 1427–29 (S.D. Fla. 1994);
Stratton v. Miller, 113 B.R. 205, 210 (D. Md. 1989).
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or] omissions is insufficient,”235 and courts cannot presume that alleged
damages are attributable to lawyers’ conduct.236 Deepening insolvency theory
rests on so many variables that are susceptible to “minute perturbations . . .
[that] there is a universe of alternate positions with few constants. Such
alternative analysis . . . entails an inquiry into what the plaintiff would have
done, with the slightest deviation in the particular hypothesized decision
producing substantially different results.”237 A plaintiff cannot show with
reasonable certainty that the corporation’s directors would have taken any one
of a number of alternate courses that may or may not have spared the company
additional indebtedness, either during the lawyers’ involvement with the
company or after.
Even assuming that a deepening insolvency claim was based on
sufficiently specific and certain damage estimates, however, recovery must
nonetheless be barred under traditional legal and equitable defenses.238 Any
damage assessment is subject to all defenses available to defeat a direct claim,
including in pari delicto, contributory and comparative negligence, assumption
of risk, and apportionment of damages, among others.239 As lawyers cannot
act to injure a corporation without cooperation and assistance from insiders,
these defenses are unavoidable.
VII. BEST PRACTICES FOR LAWYERS IN A WORLD OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY
ALLEGATIONS
Deepening insolvency, either as an independent claim or as a theory of
damages, poses a significant hazard to all lawyers serving clients in the zone of
insolvency so long as courts fail to scrutinize its shortcomings at the initial
stages of litigation. So what are lawyers who represent financially troubled

235. Luniewski v. Zeitlin, 591 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); see, e.g., Resolution
Trust Corp., 853 F. Supp. at 1428–29 (rejecting speculative damage claim); Pettigrew v. Citizens
Trust Bank, 229 B.R. 39, 42 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (same).
236. N. Ill. Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 837 N.E.2d 99, 107
(Ill. 2005) (discussing legal malpractice actions).
237. Resolution Trust Corp., 853 F. Supp. at 1425 n.2.
238. See Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 379–80 (6th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing in pari delicto defense in action by bankruptcy trustee); Sender v. Buchanan (In re
Hedged-Investments Assoc., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Hirsch v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing lack of standing as a
defense in trustee’s action against accountants).
239. See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG LLP, 389 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117–21 (D. Mass. 2005)
(recognizing in pari delicto as a complete defense to a deepening insolvency claim); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nickless (In re Advanced RISC Corp.), 324 B.R. 10, 15–
16 (D. Mass. 2005) (recognizing in pari delicto as a complete defense to a deepening insolvency
claim made by bankruptcy trustee); Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589,
620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (recognizing in pari delicto as a defense to a deepening insolvency
claim made by bankruptcy trustee).
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clients to do when it comes to shielding themselves and their firms against
deepening insolvency allegations?
Lawyers have been conditioned as to the perils of creating a paper trail
when managing their own risk. In this context, however, documenting
interactions with business leaders and diligent follow-through on troublesome
developments are critical to resisting misconduct allegations. Lawyers must be
especially careful to communicate to corporate clients all options for
addressing a particular situation. These communications must be documented
accurately. It falls upon counsel to reasonably anticipate issues that could
foreseeably go awry and to ensure that corporate officers and directors know
about and account for these possibilities in planning any course of action.
Again, these forewarnings must be fair, informed, and reliable, and must be
documented.
Some commentators suggest that lawyers who document their advice face
a conflict of interest because a bankruptcy trustee or examiner will use the
lawyers’ letters, memoranda, etc., to hang the directors and officers who
ignored the advice or who took contrary action.240 In other words, the lawyers
are documenting their advice to the board or to the company’s officers not
because it is in the company’s interest that they do so, but because it is in the
lawyers’ personal interest to document their advice to minimize their potential
liability. In this way the lawyers’ personal interests are materially limiting
their representation of the company, which is a conflict of interest.241 But that
simply is not so. The corporation’s officers and directors should be interested
in acting lawfully, and the corporation’s lawyers should be interested in
steering them that way. The fact that officers and directors may disregard the
lawyers’ advice does not mean that the lawyers’ acts of documenting their
advice manifests a conflict of interest. To the extent the lawyers’ advice itself
is ultimately placed at issue, a trustee, examiner, or receiver can simply waive
the corporation’s attorney-client privilege and depose company insiders or the
lawyers about the advice.242
In the same vein, lawyers must be mindful to provide advice and make
decisions that predictably fall under the protective umbrella of the business
judgment rule. Defensive measures include appropriate documentation,
encouraging detailed board minutes, attention to procedural formality and
thoroughness, careful attention to requisite approvals from independent
directors, and deliberated retention of independent advisors. Moreover,
240. See Conaway, supra note 16 (“It is all these CYA memos by lawyers that make it easy
for plaintiffs to tear these organizations apart.”).
241. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2004) (discussing conflicts of
interest with current clients).
242. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality
Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 441–46 (2005) (discussing the
ability of trustees, receivers, and liquidators to waive a corporation’s attorney-client privilege).
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lawyers must be sensitive to signs of insider dealing, fraudulent conveyances,
or the involvement of any relationships that risk appearing too close and hence
not disinterested. Because deepening insolvency charges implicitly accuse
lawyers of aiding and abetting client misconduct, lawyers must act responsibly
when signs of improper or fraudulent activity by corporate insiders appear.
This may require lawyers to report up the ladder, withdraw from the
representation, or take any number of other appropriate actions. Feigned
ignorance or willful blindness will not do.
Lawyers can also take additional protective steps in advance of engaging a
client to minimize the strength of a future trustee’s potential deepening
insolvency claim against the lawyer. Lawyers should review and analyze the
corporate charter, bylaws, and employment agreements governing the
employment terms and liabilities of the various directors and officers that are
likely to be the primary decision makers. In particular, lawyers should look for
and encourage the inclusion in these documents of exculpation provisions,
thwarting liability for directors and officers within certain parameters. This
strategy is particularly valuable because such provisions impede primary
liability claims against directors and officers, and can therefore impede
secondary liability claims against lawyers, to the extent that deepening
insolvency claims effectively allege that a legal professional assisted a director
or officer’s fraudulent conduct.
Furthermore, lawyers can attempt to steer clear of deepening insolvency
charges by being aware of the situations in which hindsight-driven bankruptcy
trustees or receivers have an incentive to pursue lawyer liability claims. For
instance, where a company has inadequate directors’ and officers’ (D & O)
liability insurance, a recovery-driven trustee or receiver is more likely to
initiate claims against other actors who may, in the form of their malpractice
insurance, carry with them funds that are more easily accessible. Hence,
lawyers are well-advised to ensure that their clients are covered by suitable D
& O policies.
An additional strategy may be to deepen the pool of defendants potentially
available to a trustee. To this end, lawyers should evaluate the benefits of
strictly limiting their engagement to legal advice and of retaining independent,
specialty professionals to fill the gaps of providing complementary, but nonlegal, advice. Although this strategy may have its drawbacks, it may well
function, at the end of a bad situation, to divert a plaintiff’s attention to other
deep pockets.
Unfortunately, where the client is distressed, claims against lawyers may
devolve to an inquiry into whether the lawyer was sufficiently cautious, farsighted, and risk-averse. Protecting against this reality compels lawyers to
create a reliable and accurate record of what the client and its agents knew
before choosing a certain course of action.
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CONCLUSION
Deepening insolvency theory poses greater costs than benefits. There may,
on the fringes, be some accuracy to the notion that a “corporation is not a
biological entity for which it can be presumed that any act which extends its
existence is beneficial to it.”243 This underlying logic is superficially appealing
because it appears to create a subjective field in which lawyers and other
corporate fiduciaries are compelled to assess the likely impact of their advice
and actions rather than abiding by absolute duties which may be vulnerable to
disclaimers and manipulation. But this initial theoretical appeal disregards the
practical implications of creating normative standards of conduct.
The pragmatic consequence of deepening insolvency claims or damages
against lawyers may well be that they will instill uncertainty and confusion in
the standards for legal services to clients in the zone of insolvency. The further
and natural consequence is a significant disincentive to lawyers to pursue and
advise in favor of all well-considered risks necessary to salvage a client on the
brink of insolvency. These consequences are all undesirable.

243. Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig.), 523 F. Supp. 533,
541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

